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PREPLANNED EXIT STRATEGIES IN VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper empirically considers the role of preplanned exits (the investor’s initial strategy to 
sell the investee company via an acquisition or an IPO at the time of initial contract with the 
entrepreneur), legal conditions and investor versus investee bargaining power in the allocation of cash 
flow and control rights in entrepreneurial finance.  We introduce a sample of 223 entrepreneurial 
investee firms financed by 35 venture capital funds in 11 continental European countries, and these 
data indicate the following.  First, preplanned acquisition exits are associated with stronger investor 
veto and control rights, and a greater probability that convertible securities will be used, and a lower 
probability that common equity will be used; the converse is observed for preplanned IPOs.  Second, 
investors take fewer control and veto rights and use common equity in countries of German legal 
origin, relative to Socialist, Scandinavian and French legal origin.  Third, more experienced 
entrepreneurs are more likely to get financed with common equity and less likely to be financed with 
convertible preferred equity, while more experienced investors are more likely to use convertible 
preferred equity and less likely to use common equity. 
 
Keywords:  Preplanned Exit, Contracts, Governance, Control Rights, Bargaining Power; Law and 
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1. Introduction  
 
Venture capital1 (VC) contracts govern long-term relations between entrepreneurs and their 
investors in a way that establishes cash flow and control rights.  The long-term nature of VC-
entrepreneur relationships leave entrepreneurs open to exploitation by VCs (Fried and Ganor, 2006; 
Atanasov et al., 2006), and VCs open to expropriation by entrepreneurs (Casamatta, 2003; Schmidt, 
2003; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003).  It is therefore natural for contracts to depend on the bargaining 
power of the VCs and the entrepreneurs, as well as the legal environment that governs the 
relationships between the parties.  Further, as high-tech start-up entrepreneurial firms do not have 
cash flows to pay interest on debt or dividends on equity, contracts are established in a way that 
control rights are allocated over exit decisions (Sahlman, 1990; Black and Gilson, 1998; for related 
theoretical work, see Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Berglöf, 1994; Bascha and Walz, 2001; 
Schwienbacher, 2002; Neus and Walz, 2005).  A successful exit may involve an initial public offering 
(IPO), or an acquisition (i.e., trade sale).  While previous research in VC (detailed in section 2) has 
identified international differences in both financial contracts and exit strategies, the precise 
interaction between contracts and exits has not been directly studied in empirical work.  Further, 
empirical analyses of VC contracts have not fully considered international differences in VC contracts 
in relation to VC-entrepreneur bargaining power, preplanned exit strategies and law quality.  It is 
particularly important to consider non-US evidence as legal scholarship is consistent with the view 
that tax law biases US VC contracts towards the use of convertible preferred shares (Gilson and 
Schizer, 2003). 
 
This paper develops three primary themes that facilitate our theoretical and empirical 
understanding of how entrepreneurial firms and venture capital investors write financial contracts.  
First, we empirically investigate the role of “preplanned” exit strategies at the time of contracting in 
the formation of ownership and control rights in VC contracts.  A preplanned exit strategy is a 
reasonable expectation that the investor will want to dispose of the entrepreneurial investment either 
by IPO or acquisition (trade sale), and this expectation is formed prior to contracting with the 
entrepreneur.  This expectation need not be revealed to the entrepreneur, and if it is revealed, it need 
                                                 
     1 The term ‘venture capital’ is defined differently across countries.  In this paper we employ the definition used by 
the European Venture Capital Association (www.evca.com), which is inclusive of seed, early, expansion, mezzanine (late), 
turnaround and buyout transactions.  This broad definition is also used in other jurisdictions such as Canada (www.cvca.ca).  
The main results in this paper are not contingent on the particular definition of venture capital.  As well, all of the (self-
described) venture capital funds in the data herein consider financing different types of entrepreneurial firms.  Regardless, all 
of the regression results are provided for the subset of investments in the earlier stages of development. 
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not be fully revealed.  Note that the preplanned exit strategy is not part of the contract; rather, it is a 
strategy that affects the contract design.  Second, we empirically examine the role of legal conditions 
in driving contract choices across a sample of 11 continental European countries, with a focus on anti-
director rights and creditor rights.  Third, we empirically study the influence of bargaining power of 
both the entrepreneur and the investor in the allocation of cash flow and control rights.  The three 
themes developed and empirically studied in this paper are not only complementary but also essential 
to reconciling a growing divergence in understanding financial contracting in venture capital in the 
academic literature.  That is, the vast majority of theoretical work in venture capital contracting is 
based on empirical data from the US, and US tax laws significantly biases the choice of contract 
structure towards convertible preferred equity (Gilson and Schizer, 2003).  Further, no prior study 
(based on US data and/or international data) has considered the role of preplanned exit strategies and 
the bargaining power of both the VC and the entrepreneur in contract formation.   
 
This paper analyzes a hand-collected dataset involving 223 entrepreneurial firms from 35 
European VC funds from 11 continental European countries over the period 1995-2002.  Our data 
enable a first consideration (from any country) of how contract structure and preplanned exits are 
interrelated.  The data indicate exit is often preplanned as either an IPO or an acquisition at the time of 
contracting.  VCs preplanned either an IPO or an acquisition exit in 70 of 223 entrepreneurial firms 
(31%) in which they invested.  There are 25 preplanned IPOs and 45 preplanned acquisitions; for the 
remainder of the investments, the VCs did not have a reasonable expectation as to whether exit would 
be either as an IPO or an acquisition at the time of initial contract.  We stress in this paper the 
difference between preplanned exits (at the time of contract) versus actual exits (eventual 
performance in later years).  Only 19% (6/32) of the actual IPOs were preplanned IPOs, and only 36% 
(27/74) of the actual acquisitions were preplanned acquisitions.  We do not study the factors that 
affect actual exit and returns performance in this paper; earlier work considered that issue (Cumming, 
2005b), although faced endogeneity issues.  In this paper we focus on the relation between preplanned 
exits and contract formation by making use of data which comprises unique details on the investors’ 
preplanned exit strategy prior to the time of contracting.  
 
The data indicate preplanned acquisitions (sometimes referred to as “trade sales”) are 
associated with stronger investor veto and control rights.  Preplanned acquisitions increase the 
probability of use of various veto rights (over asset sales, asset purchases, changes in control, issuance 
of equity, and other decisions) by approximately 10%.  Similarly, preplanned acquisitions increase the 
probability of use of various control rights (over the right to replace CEO, automatic conversion at 
exit, right for first refusal at sale, drag-along, co-sale agreement, anti-dilution protection, protection 
rights against new issues, redemption rights, information rights, IPO registration rights, and 
piggyback registration) by approximately 5%.  The data further indicate preplanned acquisition exits 
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increase the probability that convertible securities will be used by 18%, and lower the probability that 
common equity will be used by 33%.   
 
 The link between preplanned acquisitions exits and stronger veto rights and convertible 
securities is consistent with theory (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Berglöf, 1994; Black and Gilson, 1998; 
Bascha and Walz, 2001; Neus and Walz, 2005; Hellmann, 2006).  First, consider a situation in which 
the VC preplans an exit route but does not inform (or at least does not fully inform) the entrepreneur 
about this preplanned strategy.  An acquisition exit typically involves a the ousting of the entrepreneur 
from the firm, or at least a reduced scope of authority from their original position as CEO of the firm 
they founded; either way, the permanent loss of control is typically distasteful to the entrepreneur (see 
Petty et al., 1999, for supportive case studies, see also Black and Gilson, 1998, for a supportive 
discussion).  As such, we conjecture that VCs preplanning acquisition exits negotiate for stronger 
control rights in anticipation of a need to force the entrepreneur to acquiesce to an acquisition.  
Second, consider a situation in which the VC preplans an exit route and does inform the entrepreneur 
about this strategy.2  Entrepreneurs that will be eventually ousted from the firm in an acquisition exit 
may make decisions in the early stages of the life of the firm that are not consistent with the long term 
interests of the firm, but are consistent with the entrepreneur’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests.  
At the time of actual exit potential acquirors will therefore discount the value of an entrepreneurial 
firm for which past decisions were made by the entrepreneur.  However, if the control and veto rights 
are held by the VC then the potential acquirer in an acquisition exit will pay more for the firm upon 
exit.  VCs and entrepreneurs are therefore both better off in the case where they allocate control to the 
VC when they preplan an acquisition exit, as the expected value of the acquisition exit is high under 
VC control than entrepreneur control. 
 
The data also indicate that investors take fewer control and veto rights and use common 
equity in countries of German legal origin, relative to Socialist, Scandinavian and French legal origin.  
These results are also statistically and economically significant, as described herein.  These nature of 
the results on legality herein are broadly consistent with work highlighting legal and institutional 
differences across countries in affecting private investment contracts (Lerner and Schoar, 2005; 
Kaplan et al., 2007). 
 
Further, note that our data show more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to get 
financed with common equity and less likely to get financed with convertible preferred equity, while 
more experienced investors are more likely to use convertible preferred equity and less likely to use 
common equity.  Again, these results show very strong economic and statistical significance which 
                                                 
     2 We are indebted to Ralph Winter for very helpful discussions on this second theme. 
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are detailed in the body of this paper.  These results strongly support recent bilateral moral theories of 
venture capital finance (Casamatta, 2003; Schmidt, 2003). 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  A brief descriptive theory that outlines testable 
hypotheses is provided in section 2.  The data are introduced in section 3, and summary statistics and 
comparison tests are presented.  Section 4 provides estimates from ordered logit models of the 
determinants of security design, veto and control rights.  A discussion of limitations and future 
research follows in section 5.  The last section concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses  
 
Prior work has identified a number of potential factors that could affect the allocation of 
ownership and control rights in private investment contracts.  For example, theoretical work has 
identified the role of bilateral moral hazard and adverse selection (Casamatta, 2003; Schmidt, 2003; 
Kirilenko, 2001), exit strategies (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Berglöf, 1994; Black and Gilson, 1998; 
Bascha and Walz, 2001), and the inalienability of human capital (Hart and More, 1994).  Empirical 
studies have considered tests of these theoretical models (Gompers, 1998; Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2003), as well as the role of legality in affecting private investment contracts (Lerner and Schoar, 
2005; Kaplan et al., 2007).  Importantly, however, empirical work has not directly tested the role of 
preplanned exits in VC contract formation.  Therefore, we focus the development of testable 
hypotheses around the ways in which preplanned exits could play a role in shaping VC contract 
formation in subsection 2.1.  Thereafter in subsection 2.2 we discuss the role of law quality and 
bargaining power in influencing contract formation, as well as other control variables.  The data and 
empirical tests follow in the subsequent sections. 
 
2.1. Preplanned Exits and Venture Capital Contracts 
 
 VCs typically invest in entrepreneurial firms for 2-7 years prior to an exit event.  The two 
fundamental exit routes for successful entrepreneurial firms backed by VCs are IPOs and acquisitions 
(Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  There exists other exit routes, including buybacks (in 
which the entrepreneur repurchases the VC’s shares) and secondary sales (in which the VC sells to 
another investor but the entrepreneur does not sell), as well as write-offs (also referred to as 
liquidations).  These other exit routes, however, facilitate much lower profits upon exit (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999, 2001); therefore, VCs preplan their exit outcomes only as IPOs or acquisitions. 
 
 In our empirical analyses in this paper we identify cases in which the VC has developed a 
clear strategy as either a preplanned IPO or a preplanned acquisition.  (Note that VCs that did not 
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specifically preplan either an IPO or an acquisition at the time of investment still always hoped for 
one of these outcomes).  This preplanned exit strategy is formed at the time of investment and before 
contract formation.  The VC’s preplanned exit strategy need not be revealed to the entrepreneur at the 
time of investment, although it could be revealed to show the good intention of the VC to develop the 
firm to its full potential.  The preplanned exit strategy is not part of the contract.  A central interest in 
this paper is the study of the relation between contract formation and preplanned IPOs versus 
preplanned acquisitions. 
 
 A primary reason why the VC’s preplanned exit strategy affects contracts is that, at the time 
of actual exit, VCs are financial intermediaries between the entrepreneurial firm and the new owners 
(public shareholders in the event of an IPO, and the acquiring firm in the event of an acquisition).  
VCs facilitate two roles: (1) add value through active assistance provided to the entrepreneurial firm 
(including strategic, financial and marketing advice, as well as facilitate a network of contacts with 
legal and accounting advisors, investment banks, suppliers; see Sahlman, 1990; Manigart et al., 1996; 
Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Lockett and Wright, 2001), and (2) certify the quality of the 
entrepreneurial firm to the new owners (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lerner, 
1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Neus and Walz, 2005).  Through both roles, the sale price of the 
entrepreneurial firm is higher by virtue of the presence of the VC. 
 
In theory, it is natural to expect the allocation of control and decision rights between an 
investor and entrepreneur to depend on a preplanned IPO versus a preplanned acquisition (Aghion and 
Bolton, 1992; Berglöf, 1994; Zingales, 1995; Bascha and Walz, 2001; Neus and Walz, 2005; 
Hellmann, 2006).  Contractual governance between a private investor and an entrepreneur exists on a 
variety of dimensions, including security design, veto and control rights (such as the right to replace 
the founding entrepreneur as CEO, drag-along rights, co-sale agreements, and veto rights over asset 
sales/purchases, changes in control and issuances of equity; a complete description of these rights 
follows in section 3 below).  Our hand-collected dataset comprises information on all of these details, 
and more, as described in the next section. 
 
 In practice, there are two possible avenues through which preplanned exit strategies may 
influence contract formation.  First, consider a situation in which the VC forms a preplanned exit 
strategy but does not reveal this strategy (or at least does not fully reveal this information) to the 
entrepreneur at the time of contract negotiation.  The incentive for a VC to not reveal the information 
to the entrepreneur might be associated with preplanned acquisition exits for the following reasons.  
The acquisition exit is generally deemed to be the second best form of exit, with the IPO being the 
most preferred in terms of upside potential. More significantly, in an acquisition exit, the entrepreneur 
is effectively ousted from the firm as the CEO (Black and Gilson, 1998).  Entrepreneurs most often 
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find this permanent ousting out of the firm that they founded to be a terribly emotional event (even 
described as some entrepreneurs as equivalent to the breakdown of a marriage; see Petty et al., 1999).  
Many entrepreneurs are therefore reluctant to agree to an acquisition exit.  As such, we conjecture that 
VCs preplanning acquisition exits negotiate for stronger control rights in anticipation of a need to 
force the entrepreneur to acquiesce to an acquisition.  A VC may not inform the entrepreneur about a 
preplanned acquisition if there is concern that the entrepreneur is reluctant to agree with the 
acquisition.  Rather, the VC might indicate to the entrepreneur that the control rights are required by 
the VC for other reasons unrelated to exits, such as the risk of investing in a high-tech industry, and/or 
the comparative dearth of entrepreneur managerial track experience relative to that of the VC. 
 
 There are also cases where the VC preplans an exit route and does inform the entrepreneur 
about this strategy.  An entrepreneur may rationally agree to acquiesce control rights to the VC in 
order to facilitate the acquisition exit, such that the control rights in the hands of the VC enhance the 
sale price of the entrepreneurial firm upon exit.  The intuition is as follows.  Entrepreneurs take 
decisions during the early life of the enterprise that have effects that are not manifest until much later 
in the life of the enterprise – after much of the residual claim has been sold by the entrepreneur.  The 
implications of the decisions for future cash flows will not be observable at the time of exit.  The 
entrepreneur’s own interest in some of these decisions does not coincide with the long term interest of 
the eventual owners of the firm.  That is, there is an agency, or hidden action, problem in managerial 
decisions.  A rational capital market, even where it cannot directly observe the future cash flow 
implications of past entrepreneurial decisions at the time of purchase of the residual claim, will infer 
that the entrepreneur’s decisions were in her self-interest.  The market will discount the value of the 
residual claim accordingly to the extent that past decisions were under control of the entrepreneur.  In 
an acquisition exit (where the entrepreneur is effectively ousted from the firm, as discussed), the 
degree to which the entrepreneur’s decisions early in the life of a firm are in conflict with the long 
term eventual new owners of the firm will be more pronounced than in the case of an IPO exit (where 
the entrepreneur regains control over the enterprise).  The VC and entrepreneur therefore rationally 
agree to allocate control rights to the VC in the initial agreement in order to maximize the expected 
value of the firm at the time of actual exit.  If the entrepreneur does not want to give up control rights 
to the VC due to the loss of entrepreneur private benefits, it is much less likely that the firm will get 
financed.  Firms will get financed where the VC can compensate the entrepreneur for the loss of 
private benefits in situations where the VC reveals the preplanned acquisition strategy to the 
entrepreneur. 
 
If enhanced credibility in the “foundational value” of the enterprise at exit were the only 
effect of VC control rights, then the VC would simply be assigned all rights within the VC-
entrepreneur contract.  But of course there are offsetting advantages to the assignment of rights to the 
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entrepreneur.  These advantages reside in the entrepreneur’s informational advantage over the VC in 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise.  An efficiency cost is incurred whenever rights are 
assigned within an organization to agents not in position of best information.  The allocation of rights 
as between the entrepreneur and the VC is based on a tradeoff between the enhanced credibility of 
foundational value in assigning the rights to the VC (which we term the credibility value of VC 
control rights) and the use of the entrepreneur’s superior information in decisions for which rights are 
assigned to her.  We therefore include control variables in our empirical tests (described below). 
 
 Importantly, note that our data (described below in section 3) identify the preplanned exit at 
the time of contract formation.  We do not test the relation between the actual exit outcome and the 
contract in our empirical tests below (although we do provide some statistics comparing preplanned to 
actual exits in the subsequent sections of the paper). 
 
2.2. Law Quality and Bargaining Power in Contract Formation 
 
 As indicated in Lerner and Schoar (2005) (see also Kaplan et al., 2007; McCahery and 
Vermeulen, 2004), contracts are expected to vary by the quality of the laws in the country of 
investment.  On one hand, contracts can substitute for poor legal protections offered in a country so 
that more detailed contracts may be found in countries with lower quality laws (as found in Lerner 
and Schoar, 2005).  On the other hand, law quality can facilitate contract enforcement and give rise to 
more detailed contracts (as found in Bottazzi et al., 2005).  We add to the body of empirical evidence 
in this paper by providing additional data from a sample of continental European countries (described 
in the next section).   
 
 Investor and investee sophistication may play an equally important role in influencing 
contract formation given the correspondence between sophistication to bargaining power, and our data 
(described immediately below) offers a unique assessment of sophistication.  Consistent with 
theoretical work on the importance of bilateral moral hazard in shaping VC contracts (Casamatta, 
2003; Schmidt, 2003; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003; see also Hsu, 2004, for somewhat related empirical 
evidence showing more sophisticated investors obtain better deal prices), we expect more 
sophisticated investors to have more control and veto rights and to use convertible securities for 
reasons of providing advice and monitoring to the investee.  Conversely, and for similar reasons, we 
expect more sophisticated entrepreneurs to be financed with common equity and be faced with fewer 
veto and control rights imposed by their investors. 
 
 A number of different VC and entrepreneurial firm characteristics can affect contractual 
allocation of control and ownership rights, such the type of investor (captive or limited partnership), 
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the industry and stage of development of the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur’s capital requirements, 
and economic conditions (both across countries and across time).  The new dataset introduced below 
enables controls for each of these categories of variables. 
 
3. Data 
 
 The data comprise 223 entrepreneurial firms financed by 35 VC funds over the period 1995-
2002 in 11 continental European countries: Austria (10 firms), Belgium (12 firms), Czech (5 firms), 
Denmark (11 firms), France (6 firms), Germany (50 firms), Italy (23 firms), The Netherlands (73 
firms), Poland (12 firms), Portugal (6 firms) and Switzerland (15 firms).  As discussed in this section, 
the important and unique new element in the data considered herein is in illustrating the role of 
preplanned exit strategies in affecting contracts, which has not been considered in any prior empirical 
paper on VC and private equity contracts.3 
 
The data were obtained primarily by surveys and interviews with VC fund managers.  In 
some cases, we obtained actual contracts.  However, language was a significant barrier with the use of 
actual contracts from a diverse sample of European countries.  In most cases the contracts were not 
written in English.  As such, in order to properly read and understand the components of the contracts, 
survey and interview techniques were used.  Moreover, as we incorporate information that is not part 
of the contract in studying the formation of contracts (including measures of entrepreneurial 
sophistication, and preplanned exit strategies), it was absolutely necessary to use survey and interview 
techniques to gather the details in the data considered herein. 
 
The information collected from the 35 funds in our dataset is strictly confidential, and not 
publicly available.  Data were disclosed on a completely voluntary basis.  Given the type of 
confidential information collected, naturally we cannot refer to an aggregate industry database for 
comparison.  We can point out that our sample is similar to prior international datasets on the 
frequency of use of different securities (see, e.g., Hege et al., 2003; Schwienbacher, 2003;. Kaplan et 
al., 2007; Lerner and Schoar, 2005).  The scope of these other hand-collected VC datasets (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2003; Hege et al., 2003; Schwienbacher, 2003;. Kaplan et al., 2007; Lerner and 
Schoar, 2005) is also very similar to our own, in terms of details and number of observations, and the 
frequency of use of particular contracts is similar to that reported in this study, accounting for 
institutional differences between the US and Europe.  The most notable institutional difference 
                                                 
     3 Bascha and Walz (2007) and Kaplan et al. (2007) empirically study the relation between contracts and actual exits, 
but do not have details in respect of preplanned exits.  Schwienbacher (2003) and Hege et al. (2003) have some details on 
contracts, but these details are averaged at the fund level for all portfolio firms, and they do not have details on preplanned 
exits.  Our paper is the first to have considered empirical details on the preplanned exit strategy at the time of contracting. 
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between Europe and the US, in terms of private investor contractual governance, is in the use of 
convertible securities in the US (Sahlman, 1990; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Gompers, 1998; Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2003).  Tax considerations are one explanation for the dominant use of convertibles in 
the US (Gilson and Schizer, 2003).  That there is much heterogeneity in contract choices within each 
fund and across funds (see subsection 2.1 for details) in this dataset renders the analysis herein 
relevant and interesting; in fact, to test the propositions herein it is necessary to not use US data. 
 
 The variables used in the empirical tests are defined and summarized in Table 1 Panel A.  
Table 1 Panel B provides definitions of terms commonly found in VC contracts.  VC contracts 
independently allocate cash flow and control rights (Gompers, 1998; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003).  
Veto rights are passive rights that can be used to prevent certain actions taken by the Board of 
Directors and put to the shareholders for a vote.  Veto rights typically cover issues relating to asset 
sales, asset purchases, changes in control and issuances of equity.  Veto rights may be used as threat 
points in negotiation and hence could influence the exit outcome; VCs that preplan acquisition exits 
and anticipate a potential conflict of interest with the entrepreneur may therefore seek additional veto 
rights.  Control rights, by contrast, are proactive rights that enable the holder to bring about a change 
in the direction of the firm because they give the investors the right to take a particular action as a 
residual right of control.  As such, it is likely that a VC that preplans an acquisition exit will seek 
stronger control rights in anticipation of a potential conflict of interests with the entrepreneur at the 
time of sale.  To this end, perhaps the most effective control right in incomplete contracting theories 
like Aghion and Bolton (1992) is the right to replace the CEO.  VCs typically have the right to replace 
the founding entrepreneur as CEO where they have a majority of the board or a majority of the voting 
rights.4  Investors may also be able to force an acquisition through other measures of residual rights of 
control and generally speaking not all control rights are equally effective.  Drag along rights, by 
definition, can be particularly effective in bringing about the exit desired by the VC.  Also, 
redemption rights can be effective in forcing an acquisition, particularly where entrepreneurs are not 
in a financial position to redeem the VC’s shares.  Anti-dilution rights give VCs more bargaining 
power over sequential financing rounds, lead to a larger dilution of entrepreneurial control, and hence 
are useful for the VC to retain control and bring about a preplanned exit outcome.  Analogous to veto 
rights for changes in control, a co-sale right and a right of first refusal give investors protection if the 
entrepreneur tries to sell the firm in part or whole to a new owner, and hence can be used as threat 
points in negotiation.  Also, an IPO registration right can be used as a threat point in negotiation 
                                                 
     4 For this reason we do not independently report statistics for majority board seats and majority voting rights; the 
results were not materially different than that reported for the right to replace the founding entrepreneur as the CEO.  
Automatic conversion rights from preferred equity to common equity are not separately considered in the list of control 
rights because this right is not used to force a particular exit strategy but rather it is a pre-commitment by the VC to give up 
control rights upon a sufficiently valuable exit. 
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where the entrepreneurial firm is not yet in a position to be a publicly listed firm.  Finally, information 
rights typically call for the firm to supply timely financial statements and other items not generally 
available to other stakeholders, and hence may be more relevant for firms preplanning exit strategies.  
Overall, however, the stronger control rights in relation to preplanned exit strategies are typically the 
right to replace the CEO, drag along, redemption and anti-dilution rights.  The other rights are also 
potentially relevant.  In the multivariate empirical analysis below we consider the sum of these rights 
as well as independently analyze the rights separately. 
 
[Table 1 Panels A and B About Here] 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for each of the variables.  Among the 35 funds in the 
data, no fund provided data on fewer than 2 entrepreneurial firms, and no fund provided data on more 
than 20 entrepreneurial firms.  Data cannot be disclosed on a fund-by-fund basis due to confidentiality 
(some funds were worried their identity might be “reverse engineered” from reporting fund-specific 
data).  Seventy-eight entrepreneurial firms in the data were financed by captive funds that were 
affiliated (wholly owned) by a bank or a corporation (the remainder were limited partnership VCs), 
and 11 funds were captive funds.  The typical fund manager in the data manages €30,000,000 and 
typically invests less than €5,000,000 (in 2003 Euros) in the entrepreneurial firms.  Most (67%) of the 
entrepreneurs in the data were in the early stage of development at the time of first investment (extra 
details are in Table 2). 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
Table 2 shows that the VCs in the sample typically used all of the 5 types of veto rights as 
well as 5 of the 9 different control rights identified in Table 1 Panels A and B.  Table 2 also shows 
common equity was used for 45% of the entrepreneurs; convertible preferred equity was used for 32% 
of entrepreneurs; debt and common was used for 19% and straight debt was used for 4% of 
entrepreneurs in the data.  This evidence is quite consistent with all other non-US samples (Bascha 
and Walz, 2001; Cumming, 2005a; Schwienbacher, 2003; Hege et al., 2003; Kaplan et al., 2007; 
Lerner and Schoar, 2005), but in the US VCs typically use convertible preferred equity, and there is a 
tax incentive associated with that security in the US (Gilson and Schizer, 2003).  The securities used 
by year of investment are presented in Figure 1, and the preplanned IPOs and acquisitions by year of 
investment are indicated in Figure 2. 
 
[Figures 1 and 2 About Here] 
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Table 2 shows that VCs preplanned either an IPO or an acquisition exit in 70 of 223 
entrepreneurial firms (31%) in which they invested.  There are 25 preplanned IPOs and 45 preplanned 
acquisitions; for the remainder of the investments, the VCs did not have a reasonable expectation as to 
whether exit would be either as an IPO or an acquisition at the time of initial contract.  We stress in 
this paper the difference between preplanned exits (at the time of contract) versus actual exits 
(eventual performance in later years).  Table 3 indicates there exist 187 actual exits as at 2005 (of the 
223 entrepreneurial firms) in the data (32 actual IPOs, 74 actual acquisitions, 17 actual buybacks, and 
64 actual write-offs), and among these 187 actual exits, 132 were not preplanned (71%).  As well, 15 
of 70 preplanned exits (21%) have not been actually exited in the data.  Only 19% (6/32) of the actual 
IPOs were preplanned IPOs, and only 36% (27/74) of the actual acquisitions were preplanned 
acquisitions.  We do not study the factors that affect actual exit and returns performance in this paper; 
earlier work considered that issue (Cumming, 2005b), although faced endogeneity issues.  In this 
paper we focus on the relation between preplanned exits and contract formation by making use of data 
which comprises unique details on the investors’ preplanned exit strategy prior to the time of 
contracting.  Actual exits that are not preplanned do not affect contract design, since the actual exit 
event happens typically 3-4 years after first investment.  By contrast, exits that are preplanned happen 
prior to contract formation, and therefore may affect contract design, as considered herein. 
 
[Table 3 About Here] 
 
Table 4 provides a correlation matrix for each of the variables defined in Table 1 Panel A.  It 
is noteworthy, first, that contract terms are complementary.  That is, common equity is more often 
associated with fewer investor control and veto rights, while convertible preferred equity is more 
often associated with stronger investor control and veto rights, which supports recent theoretical 
research (Cestone, 2000).5  Second, note that stronger investor control and veto rights is positively 
correlated with preplanned acquisition exits, whereas preplanned IPOs are positively correlated with 
common equity contracts.  Third, the data indicate legal and market conditions are related to different 
contract terms, as in Lerner and Schoar (2005) and Kaplan et al. (2007).6  Finally, the correlations in 
Table 4 indicate investee and investor characteristics are related to contracts; for instance, captive 
                                                 
     5 In Cestone’s model, the intuition is based on the idea that formal control with common equity would turn into 
excessive real control (over interference) because VCs have greater incentives to intervene with riskier claims (Cestone, 
2000, p.15).  Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003, similarly find that different control rights are complementary, not substitutes, in 
the US where convertible preferred equity is typically the selected security. 
     6 The relation between the legal system and contracts in our data is in some dimensions different than that reported 
in Lerner and Schoar (2005).  For example, Lerner and Schoar find strong control rights are used in weaker legal systems; 
however, their sample is derived from developing countries, whereas our sample is primarily from well developed 
continental European countries. 
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funds are more likely to take veto rights, and more experienced entrepreneurs (as ranked by the VC; 
see Table 1 Panel A for the variable definition7) are more likely to be financed with common equity.   
 
[Table 4 About Here] 
 
Table 5 presents additional summary statistics and comparison of proportions, means and 
medians for preplanned IPOs versus preplanned acquisitions.  The data indicate preplanned IPOs have 
a statistically significant greater proportion of common equity investments, while preplanned 
acquisitions have a statistically significant greater mean and median number of veto and control 
rights.  These results are consistent with theoretical predictions in section 2.  In Table 5, the only 
statistically insignificant difference is in the proportion of convertible preferred equity investments 
between preplanned IPOs and preplanned acquisitions (but nevertheless that difference is consistent 
with the relations hypothesized in section 2).  Overall, therefore, the univariate comparison tests in 
Table 5 (alongside the correlation matrix in Table 4) are quite supportive of the hypotheses in section 
2.  Section 4 below investigates the univariate statistics more fully by considering multivariate tests.  
Section 5 thereafter discusses limitations (such as possibly relevant details not comprised in the data, 
among other things) and future research. 
 
[Table 5 About Here] 
 
4. Multivariate Tests 
 
 This section is organized as follows.  Subsection 4.1 presents the regression analyses of the 
total number of veto and control rights used in the contracts.  Subsection 4.2 similarly carries out logit 
analyses of the determinants of the security choice.  In both subsections 4.1 and 4.2 we use 4 
alternative models with a different set of right-hand-side variables to check robustness.  The same 
four models are used for each dependent variable analyzed. 
 
4.1. Veto and Control Rights 
 
The regression results in Table 6 strongly and consistently indicate preplanned acquisitions 
are associated with stronger investor veto and control rights.  Preplanned acquisitions increase the 
probability of use of five different veto rights (over asset sales, asset purchases, changes in control, 
                                                 
     7 This ranking was taken at the time of recording the data and in follow-up meetings and calls to the investors.  The 
respondent was told that the ranking is intended for the time of investment, so this variable is at best an imperfect proxy.  It 
is nevertheless a useful control variable to account for the role of entrepreneurial ability in contract formation. 
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issuance of equity, and other decisions) by approximately 10%.8  Similarly, preplanned acquisitions 
increase the probability of use of the different control rights (over the right to replace CEO, automatic 
conversion at exit, right for first refusal at sale, co-sale agreement, drag along rights, anti-dilution 
protection, protection rights against new issues, redemption rights, information rights, IPO registration 
rights, and piggyback registration) by approximately 5%.  These results provide a unique test and 
strong supporting evidence of theories linking exit to contract formation (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; 
Berglöf, 1994; Black and Gilson, 1998; Bascha and Walz, 2001; Hellmann, 2006), as described in 
section 2. 
 
[Table 6 About Here] 
 
It is noteworthy that investors take fewer control rights in countries of German legal origin, 
relative to Socialist, Scandinavian and French legal origin (Models 7-9) (the dummy variable for 
French legal origin is suppressed to avoid collinearity problems).  In terms of the economic 
significance, the probability of no control rights used in a contract with an entrepreneur resident in a 
German legal origin country is 11% higher than that for an entrepreneur resident in a French legal 
origin country, and the probability that the contract contains all the control rights enumerated in Table 
1 is 27% lower in German legal origin countries than French legal origin countries.  One possible 
explanation for this result is in relation to institutional factors particular to Germany, such as the bank 
dominated financial system, and the incentives for private equity funds in Germany to compete with 
banks by offering contracts with fewer control rights (this interpretation is consistent with the German 
venture capital market in Becker and Hellmann, 2005).  Model 2 also indicates there are fewer veto 
rights in Germany relative to that in France, although this difference is not statistically significant in 
Models 3-5.  Models 3-5 indicate more veto rights in Socialist legal origin countries (the probability 
of no veto rights in these countries is 19% lower than that for French legal origin countries), while 
Models 2-4 indicate fewer veto rights in Scandinavian legal origin countries (the probability of no 
veto rights is 39% higher than that for French legal origin countries). 
 
Note that when we use the legality index alone in Models 1 and 6 (separated from the Legal 
origin and GNP per capita, due to collinearity), we find more control rights are used in countries with 
stronger legal protections.  The economic significance is such that an increase in legality from 19 to 
20 (for example, for a move that is approximately equivalent to a move from France to the 
Netherlands) increases the use of an extra veto right by 2% and an extra control right by 1%.  It is 
possible this latter result is due to more efficient contract enforcement (cost-effective, and with 
reasonable certainty) in countries with better legal systems, and hence it is worthwhile to write such 
                                                 
     8 The marginal effects for the logit models were calculated using Limdep Econometric Software. 
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contracts.9  This evidence is consistent with an independent sample of European VC investments 
which shows that in better legal systems investors demand more contractual downside protection, 
using securities such as debt, convertible debt, or preferred equity (see the contemporaneous working 
paper of Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann, 2005). 
 
There is some evidence in Table 6 that the quality of the entrepreneur influences the extent of 
control rights assigned to the VC.  VCs’ are 16% more likely to have no control rights when the 
quality of the entrepreneur ranking increases by 1, and 1% more likely to have all the control rights 
enumerated in Table 1 when the quality of the entrepreneur ranking increases by 1 (and these results 
are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels in Models 8 and 9, respectively).  It is intuitive 
that VCs would demand less control over entrepreneurs for which the view as being of higher quality.  
Table 6 further indicates captive investors are approximately 20% more likely to take a greater 
number of veto rights.  This result is consistent with Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Riyanto and 
Schwienbacher (2006) who indicate strategic reasons (alongside financial goals) for corporate venture 
finance increases the probability of control among the investor so that the VC can appropriate the 
innovation in ways consistent with the VC’s companion corporate operations. 
 
The control variables include various other VC fund characteristics and entrepreneurial firm 
characteristics, international differences across the countries considered, as well as differences over 
time (the sample spans the years 1995-2002, and dummy variables for each year except 2002 are used 
in Models 4 and 8 to check for robustness).  It is noteworthy that perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, we 
observe fewer veto rights for earlier stage investees.  We may have expected a greater number 
investor veto rights for early stage investees due to the increased risk.  One possible explanation is 
related to the time period considered around the Internet bubble, and the phenomenon of money 
chasing deals with few control rights for high-tech start-ups (Gompers and Lerner, 2000), which is 
consistent with more favourable deal terms for early stage investees. 
 
As a further robustness check, Table 7 provides logit analyses of specific control and veto 
rights (instead of the sum of the control rights and the sum of the veto rights as in Table 6).  The 
results are generally consistent with Table 6 but indicate more precisely which control and veto rights 
are directly influenced by each explanatory variable.  Preplanned acquisitions are statistically 
associated with a greater probability of use of the right to replace the founding entrepreneur as CEO 
(the economic significance is 28.2% higher probability in Model 11), first refusal in sale (19.9% 
                                                 
     9 Lerner and Schoar (2005) find a somewhat different result, and therefore argue contracts substitute for poor legal 
protection.  The difference between these results across papers is most likely attributable to the different countries 
considered.  Lerner and Schoar study a more heterogeneous sample of developing economies from different continents, 
whereas our data are restricted to continental Europe. 
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higher probability in Model 12), co-sale rights (44.7% higher probability in Model 13), anti-dilution 
(48.5% higher probability in Model 14), redemption rights (13.9% higher probability in Model 16), 
protection rights against new issues (26.2% higher probability in Model 17), veto rights over asset 
sales (22.6% higher probability in Model 18), veto rights over asset purchases (20.3% higher 
probability in Model 19) and veto rights over changes in control (14.8% higher probability in Model 
20).  Preplanned IPOs are associated with a 14.9% lower probability of drag along rights, and 
preplanned acquisitions are associated with a 5.7% greater probability of drag along rights.10  All of 
these results are consistent with prior theory that VC control is more important when VCs preplan 
acquisition exits, and less important when VCs  preplan IPO exits, since VCs are more likely to have 
to use their control rights to force an acquisition on an unwilling entrepreneur (among other reasons 
discussed in section 2). 
 
[Table 7 About Here] 
 
 Table 7 shows German legal origin countries are 11.3% less likely to use anti-dilution rights 
(Model 14), 6.8% less likely to use redemption rights (Model 16), and 30.6% less likely to use 
protection rights against new issues (Model 17) than French legal origin countries.  Socialist legal 
origin countries are 29.1% more likely to have contracts with protection rights against new issues 
(Model 17) and veto rights of issuing equity (Model 21) than French legal origin countries.  
Scandinavian legal origin countries are 44.4% less likely to have contracts with veto rights over asset 
sales (Model 18), 41.4% less likely to have veto rights over asset purchases (Model 19) and 69.9% 
less likely to have veto rights over issuing new equity (Model 21) than French legal origin countries. 
 
 Table 7 also indicates that the quality of the VC and the entrepreneur matter for the allocation 
of control and veto rights.  More experienced investors (proxied by capital managed per manager) are 
more likely to have the right to replace the CEO and veto rights over changes in control (an increase 
from €30,000,000 to €40,000,000 in capital managed increases the probability of the right to replace 
the CEO by 3% (Model 11) and veto rights over changes in control by 4% (Model 20)), which is 
consistent with the view that more experienced investors can demand greater control rights.11  
Similarly, more experienced entrepreneurs are less likely to contracts that give up drag along control 
rights to VCs: an increase in the entrepreneur experience rank by 1 reduces the probability of drag 
along rights by 5.3% (Model 15). 
                                                 
     10 With a more parsimonious specification, drag along rights are 14.7% more likely to be observed when the VC 
preplans an acquisition exit. 
     11 However, more experienced investors are also less likely to have protection rights against new issues (Model 17), 
and there does not appear to be a good explanation for that coefficient (except that more parsimonious models gave rise to 
statistical significance of this one result in Model 17). 
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The other variables control variables in Table 7 are generally consistent with those discussed 
above in Table 6.  At a broad level, regardless of the specification, the general lesions from Table 6 
and 7 is that VCs use stronger control and veto rights when they preplan acquisition exits, and weaker 
control rights in countries of German and Scandinavian legal origin, and weaker control rights when 
the entrepreneur has stronger bargaining power and the VC has weaker bargaining power.  The next 
subsection considers complementary evidence for security design in terms of the use of straight 
common equity versus convertible preferred equity. 
 
4.2. Security Design 
 
Consistent with the regressions in Tables 6 and 7, the regression results in Table 8 indicate 
preplanned acquisition exits increase the probability that convertible securities will be used by 
approximately 18% (Models 27-31; the coefficients are significant at at least the 10% level in all 
models, and the economic significance ranges from 13.6% to 30.1%), and a lower the probability that 
common equity will be used by approximately 33% (Models 22-26; the coefficients are significant at 
the 1% level in all models, but the economic significance ranges from 22.6% to 35.3%).  As in 
subsection 4.1, these results provide a unique test and of theories linking exit to contract formation 
(Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Berglöf, 1994; Black and Gilson, 1998; Bascha and Walz, 2001; Neus and 
Walz, 2005; Hellmann, 2006).  The results are consistent with the view that VCs take stronger control 
rights to force acquisition exits on potentially unwilling entrepreneurs that might prefer to otherwise 
become the CEO of a publicly traded firm (see section 2 for additional potential explanations for this 
observed phenomenon; see also Black and Gilson, 1998, for a supportive theory, and Petty et al., 1999 
for supportive case studies). 
 
[Table 8 About Here] 
 
The results in Table 7 also indicate that investors are more likely to use common equity in 
countries of German legal origin (Model 23 indicates 19.6% more likely; however this result is 
significant only at the 10% level and insignificant in the other models), relative to French legal origin.  
These results highlight a role for legal and institutional differences across countries in affecting 
private investment contracts (as in Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Kaplan et al., 2007).  The results 
regarding German legal origin and common equity in Table 8 are consistent with Table 6 (showing 
German legal origin is associated with weak control and veto rights, discussed above) in that common 
equity similarly involves weaker investor protection than preferred equity in bankruptcy states.  
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Social and Scandinavian legal origin countries are much less likely to 
be associated with common equity and more likely to be associated with convertible preferred equity 
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than French legal origin countries.  These latter results are generally statistically significant at the 1% 
level in Models 23-26 and Models 28-31, and economically large (the economic significance 
generally ranges from 30%-69% in the various models).  Our discussions with VCs in these countries 
indicated tax reasons for adopting these securities (in a way consistent with Gilson and Schizer, 
2003), and the large tax rates made this a primary concern.  We were generally informed that specific 
details depended the entrepreneurial firm’s situation and the country in which the firm was resident, 
but we were not privy to obtaining any specific details.  The specific nature of the tax codes and tax 
benefits with different securities in different countries is beyond the scope of our analysis; further 
research is warranted. 
 
Finally, note that the results in Table 8 indicate more experienced entrepreneurs are more 
likely to be financed with common equity (Models 24-26) and less likely to be financed with 
convertible preferred equity (Models 29-31).  The economic significance is such that an increase in 
the entrepreneur’s experience ranking by 1 increases the probability of use of common equity by 9-
10% (Models 24 and 25; however this effect is not statistically significant in Model 26 for the 
subsample of earlier stage investments), and decreases the probability of use of convertible preferred 
equity by 2.9% (Model 30) to 6.5% (Model 31, for the subsample of earlier stage investments).  
Similarly, more experienced investors (proxied by the amount of capital raised per manager) are more 
likely to use convertible preferred equity and less likely to use common equity, and this effect is 
statistically significant at at least the 5% level in each of Models 24-26 and Models 29-31.  The 
economic significance indicates an increase in capital per manager from €30,000,000 to €40,000,000 
reduces the probability of use of common equity by approximately 4% (Model 24) to 7% (Model 26 
for the subsample of earlier stage investments), and increases the probability of use of convertible 
preferred equity by approximately 2% (Model 30) to 5% (Model 31 for the subsample of earlier stage 
investments).  These results are very supportive of bilateral moral theories (e.g., Casamatta, 2003; 
Schmidt, 2003).  These results are also consistent with US evidence provided by Hsu (2004) which 
shows more sophisticated investors tend to obtain more favourable deal terms for themselves, and 
entrepreneurs are happy to pay for affiliation with more sophisticated investors in terms of signing 
contracts that are more favourable to the investor. 
 
In sum, the data indicate in Table 8 strong robustness of the results that security design is a 
significant function of preplanned exits, legal origin and the bargaining power of the VC and 
entrepreneur, consistent with the allocation of control rights (Tables 6 and 7).  Common equity is 
more often used in countries of German legal origin and among higher quality entrepreneurs, while 
convertible preferred equity is more often used for preplanned acquisition exits, in countries of 
Socialist and Scandinavian legal origin, and for VCs of higher quality in terms of their capital 
managed per manager.   
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5. Limitations and Future Research 
 
 We presented many robustness checks in section 4 with a wide variety of explanatory 
variables and dependent variables.  Numerous alternative specifications were considered.  We 
controlled for a very large number of different firm-specific and private investor-specific 
characteristics, market conditions and institutional factors.  The information considered was hand-
collected, and highly confidential. We have no reason to believe the variables considered in this paper 
are incomplete, although more detailed data and/or a greater volume of data could shed further light 
on the issues raised.  It is possible that other confidential data are relevant, but inclusion/exclusion of 
our control variables did not point to any pronounced concerns about robustness of the tests of the 
central hypotheses considered.  We nevertheless outline a number of suggestions for future work. 
 
 First, the ways in which contracts between investors are negotiated in respect of preplanned 
exit behaviour might be a fruitful avenue of further theoretical and empirical work.  For instance, one 
might build into the analyses behavioural factors related to trust and/or over-optimism in the spirit of 
Landier and Thesmar (2007) and Manigart et al. (2002).  Ideally, such data would enable controls for 
the expected performance and perceived quality of the venture.  Our dataset provided some new 
control variables for entrepreneurial firm quality and VC fund quality; future work might consider 
more refined control variables with more detailed data.  Further empirical research along these lines 
could also consider investor valuations practices and due diligence reviews, as well as the interplay 
between contractual governance, innovation and performance (in the spirit of Kortum and Lerner, 
2000; Baker and Gompers, 2003).  Further empirical work in this regard might also consider sources 
of funds in the spirit of Mayer et al. (2005); our data only enabled a control variable for captive 
investors versus non-captives. 
 
 Second, recall (section 2) that our intuition linking preplanned exits to contracts involved two 
themes: one involved the VC disclosing to the entrepreneur the exit strategy, and the other did not.  
We argued that both themes yielded similar predictions which were supported in the data.  However, 
there may theoretically be cases in which the entrepreneur faces a tradeoff when he knows the VCs 
preplanned exit strategy is a acquisition: if he gives the VC more control, the firm is going to have a 
higher exit value but at the same time he loses his private benefits; if he gives the VC less control, the 
firm is going to have a lower exit value but the entrepreneur is able to retain his private benefits.  We 
may also expect, however, that firms will not get financed in the latter case where the VC’s 
preplanned exit strategy is towards an acquisition and an entrepreneur does not want to give up 
control rights.  Regardless, as discussed we were unable to empirically distinguish between these two 
themes due to an inability to obtain details from the investors as to when the preplanned exit strategy 
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was revealed to the entrepreneur (the vast majority of the VCs did not want to disclose this 
information).  Further empirical work might shed more light on this issue if and where new data can 
be obtained. 
 
 Third, other variables considered but not explicitly reported included portfolio size per 
manager and tax differences across countries (in the spirit of Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003, 
2004; Keuschnigg, 2004; Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2001, 2003a,b, 2004a,b).  These factors did not 
materially impact the analysis of the variables already considered.  It is most likely that preplanned 
exits influence portfolio size per manager, which could be the subject of a new and different paper; 
but our data comprise 35 VC funds, and it is therefore not possible to fully consider this issue. 
 
Fourth, as mentioned in section 3 of this paper, the unit of analysis is the entrepreneurial firm, 
and not an investment round or syndicated investor.  Syndicated investors almost invariably used the 
same securities as those used by the investors that provided these data.  Only in 6 of 223 cases were 
differences observed (where the syndicated investor used common equity or warrants when the 
respondent investor used a security involving debt and/or preferred equity).  It is also noteworthy that 
the private investors did not indicate significant alterations to their contract structures across financing 
rounds (since they felt that the negotiation and transactions costs would outweigh any benefits).  
Further theoretical work in the spirit of Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2003) and empirical work in the 
spirit of Lerner (1994), Lockett and Wright (2001), and Gompers (1995) could consider staging and 
syndication vis-à-vis preplanned exits; those topics are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Finally, note that our empirical analysis in this paper is specific to the VC context in which 
investment is invariably made with a view towards exit in the form of an IPO or acquisition.  Other 
theories about going public (e.g., Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; Boot and Thakor, 2006) more 
generally consider companies that are not necessarily financed by VCs that invest with a view towards 
an IPO or acquisition.  As our tests carried out in this paper are in a somewhat more restricted context, 
future research could explore more direct tests of those models (in the spirit of Pagano et al., 1998, 
Pagano and Roell, 1998, and Roell 1996). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper introduced an empirical analysis of the relation between preplanned IPO and 
acquisition exits and contractual ownership and control rights.  We provide a unique test and 
supporting evidence of theories linking exit to contract formation (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Berglöf, 
1994; Black and Gilson, 1998; Bascha and Walz, 2001; Neus and Walz, 2005).  We considered a new 
data sample of 223 investments from 35 VC funds in 11 continental European countries.  The data 
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uniquely enabled consideration of the role of preplanned exits in contract formation in venture 
finance.  A preplanned exit strategy is a reasonable expectation that the investor will want to dispose 
of the entrepreneurial investment either by IPO or acquisition, and this expectation is formed prior to 
contracting with the entrepreneur.   
 
The data indicated preplanned acquisitions are associated with stronger investor veto and 
control rights, and a greater probability that convertible securities will be used, and a lower 
probability that common equity will be used.  An acquisition exit typically involves a the ousting of 
the entrepreneur from the firm, or at least a reduced scope of authority from their original position as 
CEO of the firm they founded; either way, the permanent loss of control is typically distasteful to the 
entrepreneur (see Petty et al., 1999, for supportive case studies, see also Black and Gilson, 1998, for a 
supportive qualitative theory).  As such, it was expected that VCs preplanning acquisition exits would 
negotiate for stronger control rights in case it became necessary to force an entrepreneur to acquiesce 
to an acquisition.  We also hypothesized that it would be in the interest of both the VC and 
entrepreneur to allocate stronger control rights to the VC to maximize the value of the firm upon an 
acquisition exit. 
 
In testing the theories pertaining to preplanned exit and contracts with the use of a variety of 
control variables, it is noteworthy that we found that investors take fewer control and veto rights and 
use common equity in countries of German legal origin, relative to Socialist, Scandinavian and French 
legal origin.  The data also indicated that more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to get 
financed with common equity and less likely to get financed with convertible preferred equity, while 
more experienced investors are more likely to use convertible preferred equity and less likely to use 
common equity.  These results strongly support recent theoretical work on bilateral moral hazard and 
contracting in VC finance (Casamatta, 2003; Schmidt, 2003).   
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Figure 2. Preplanned IPOs and Acquisitions by Year of Investment
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Table 1.  Panel A. Variable Definitions 
This table defines each of the variables used in the text and subsequent tables in the paper.  The data are from Germany, The Czech Republic, The Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, France, Belgium, Poland, Austria and Portugal.  The contract terms were primarily gathered by surveys and interviews with the investors.  
The contracts (for the majority of the investments) were not written in English, and therefore they could not be interpreted by the authors without the use of surveys and 
interviews. 
Variable Definition 
Preplanned Exit Strategy  
Preplanned IPO 
A dummy variable equal to one if, at the time of investment and writing the contract, the investor had a reasonable expectation that the 
investment would be exited via an IPO.  The investor may or may not have informed the investee that the anticipated exit strategy was 
an IPO.  If the investor preplanned an acquisition exit, or did not have a preplanned exit strategy (either a preplanned IPO or preplanned 
acquisition), then this variable takes the value zero.  Preplanned IPOs are distinct from actual IPOs (i.e., preplanned IPOs are distinct 
from how the investment turned out).  The preplanned exit is a strategy, and not part of the contract. 
Preplanned Acquisition 
A dummy variable equal to one if, at the time of investment and writing the contract, the investor had a reasonable expectation that the 
investment would be exited via an acquisition (sometimes referred to as a “trade sale” in practice).  The investor may or may not have 
informed the investee that the anticipated exit strategy was an acquisition.  If the investor preplanned an IPO exit, or did not have a 
preplanned exit strategy (either a preplanned IPO or preplanned acquisition), then this variable takes the value zero. Preplanned 
acquisitions are distinct from actual IPOs (i.e., preplanned acquisitions are distinct from how the investment turned out).  The 
preplanned exit is a strategy, and not part of the contract. 
Market Conditions and 
Institutional Variables   
Legality Index 
Weighted average of following legal factors of the country in which the entrepreneur is based (based on Berkowitz et al. (2003), and La 
Porta et al. (1998)): civil versus common law systems, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of 
contract repudiation, shareholder rights. Higher numbers indicate 'better' legal systems.   
Anti-Director Rights 
An index aggregating the shareholder rights from La Porta et al. (1998).  The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general 
shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have pre-emptive rights 
that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote.  
Creditor Rights 
An index aggregating different creditor rights from La Porta et al. (1998).  The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country 
imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain 
possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first 
in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization.  
GNP Per Capita The GNP per capita of the country in which the entrepreneur is based. 
Legal Origin Variables Dummy variables equal to one for legal origin from La Porta et al. (1998), including German, Socialist and Scandinavian (a dummy variable equal to one for French legal origin is suppressed to avoid collinearity; there are no countries of English legal origin in the data). 
Investor and Investee 
Characteristics   
Captive Fund A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is a captive fund.  A captive fund is one that is affiliated with a bank or corporation. 
Capital Managed / 
Manager 
The total amount of capital (in 2003 Euros) for the specific fund within the investor's organization that provided data for this study, and 
divided by the number of VC fund managers employed by the fund. 
Industry Market / Book The industry market / book ratio for the industry in which the entrepreneurial firm operates. 
Book Value The value of the investors' investments in the entrepreneurial firm (in 2003 Euros). 
Early Stage Investee 
A dummy variable equal to zero if the entrepreneurial firm was a late stage or buyout transaction, and one if the firm was an early or 
expansion stage firm.  More specific categories are not used since there are differences in definitions of investment stages across 
countries. 
Entrepreneur Experience 
Rank 
A subjective ranking provided by the investor about the entrepreneur's ability and experience.  The ranking was provided at the time of 
data collection, not at the time of actual investment, but was asked as the ranking from the perspective at the time of investment.  The 
ranking was done on a scale of 1 - 10. 
Transaction Characteristics   
Sum of Veto Rights Sum of the following veto rights used in the contract with the entrepreneur: asset sales, asset purchases, changes in control, issuance of equity, any other decisions (see Table 1 Panel B). 
Sum of Control Rights 
Sum of the following control rights used in the contract with the entrepreneur: right to replace CEO, right for first refusal at sale, co-sale 
agreement, drag-along rights, anti-dilution protection, protection rights against new issues, redemption rights, information rights, and 
IPO registration rights (see Table 1 Panel B). 
Common Equity A dummy variable equal to one where the VC uses common equity to finance the entrepreneurial firm. 
Convertible Preferred 
Equity 
A dummy variable equal to one where the VC uses convertible preferred equity (and functional equivalents, such as convertible debt) to 
finance the entrepreneurial firm. 
Mix of Common and 
Preferred Equity A dummy variable equal to one where the VC uses common equity with preferred equity and/or debt to finance the entrepreneurial firm. 
Debt A dummy variable equal to one where the VC uses non-convertible debt and/or non-convertible preferred equity to finance the entrepreneurial firm. 
Prior Round A dummy variable equal to one if there was at least one round of VC investment prior to observing the VC proving the data in this dataset. 
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Table 1.  Panel B. Definitions of Specific Terms Used in VC Contracts 
This table describes specific terms used in typical VC contracts.  Contract terms are categorized into three areas: security design, veto rights and control rights.  
Contract terms are independently negotiated and may or may not be used in conjunction with others. 
Variable Definition 
Security  
Common Equity 
Securities representing equity ownership in a corporation, providing voting rights, entitling the holder to a share of the company’s 
success through dividends and/or capital appreciation.  In the event of liquidation, common stockholders have rights to a company's 
assets only after debt holders and preferred stockholders have been satisfied. 
Preferred Equity 
Capital stock that takes precedence over common equity in the event of bankruptcy, and provides that pre-specified dividends are paid 
before any dividends are paid to common equity.  Preferred dividends are fixed and do not fluctuate.  Preferred equity holders cannot 
force the company into bankruptcy in the event of non-payment of dividends, but must pay all preferred dividends in arrears prior to 
paying dividends to common equity holders. 
Debt An amount owed to a person or organization for funds borrowed.  Companies that fail to pay interest on debt can be forced into bankruptcy by debt-holders. 
Convertible Preferred 
Equity Preferred equity that can be converted into a specified amount of common equity at the holder's option. 
Convertible Debt Debt that can be converted into a specified amount of common stock at the holder's option. 
Veto Rights  
Asset Sales The holder can prevent the board from raising the issue or resolution of asset sales at the shareholder level.  
Asset Purchases The holder can prevent the board from raising the issue or resolution of asset purchases at the shareholder level. 
Changes in Control The holder can prevent the board from raising the issue or resolution of changes in control of the company at the shareholder level. 
Issuances of Equity The holder can prevent the board from raising the issue or resolution of issuing new equity at the shareholder level. 
Other Decisions 
The holder can prevent the board from raising any particular issue or resolution at the shareholder level.  For example, these issues 
include, but are not limited to, hiring key personnel, external consultants, legal and accounting advisors, releasing information to the 
public, or other decisions. 
Control Rights  
Right to Replace CEO The holder has the right to replace the founding entrepreneur as the CEO of the company.  This right is either explicit or implicit by virtue of a combination of other rights (such as through a majority of board seats or holding other rights enumerated below). 
Right of First Refusal at 
Sale 
Before the firm can be sold, the holder of the right of first refusal at sale must be offered the same terms for sale of his or her own shares.  
The firm cannot be sold to another party unless the holder turns down the terms that are offered. 
Co-Sale Agreement Any stakeholder that wishes to sell the firm must also offer to the holder of a co-sale agreement the option to sell his or her shares at the same terms. 
Drag-Along Rights The holder can force the other stakeholders to sell their shares at the same terms as that which is being sold by the holder. 
Anti-Dilution Protection The holder is entitled to proportional equity allocations that maintain a constant equity ownership percentage in the company. 
Protection Rights Against 
New Issues 
The holder has the right to vote on this issue at the stakeholder level.  The votes per share may be disproportionately allocated towards 
certain stakeholders such as the VC. 
Redemption Rights The holder of redemption shares has the right to make the entrepreneurial firm redeem the shares as per the terms of the agreement.  Typically, the terms specify the redemption price per share and the date at which the holder may seek redemption. 
Information Rights The holder has the right to obtain information above and beyond that usually provided to other stakeholders, if requested. 
IPO Registration Rights 
The holder can compel the company to register shares held by the investor on a stock exchange.  Often the holder of IPO registration 
rights also has piggyback registration rights, which enables the holder can compel the company that is already in the process of filing a 
registration statement to extend the registration statement to cover the holder’s class of shares.  The sum of control rights variable in 
Table 1 Panel A does not double count IPO registration rights and piggyback registration rights but does consider IPO registration rights. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of each of the variables defined in Table 1 Panel A. 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
Times Dummy 
Variable Equal 
to One 
Number of 
Observations 
Preplanned Exit 
Strategy               
Preplanned IPO 0.112 0 0.316 0 1 25 223 
Preplanned 
Acquisition 0.202 0 0.402 0 1 45 223 
Market 
Conditions and 
Institutional 
Variables 
              
Legality Index 20.090 20.76 2.045 15 21.91   223 
Anti-Director 
Rights        
Creditor Rights        
GNP Per Capita 21362.511 20950 6371.435 5270 35760   223 
German Legal 
Origin 0.336 0 0.474 0 1 75 223 
Socialist Legal 
Origin 0.076 0 0.266 0 1 17 223 
Scandinavian 
Legal Origin 0.049 0 0.217 0 1 11 223 
Investor and 
Investee 
Characteristics 
              
Captive Fund 0.350 0 0.478 0 1 78 223 
Capital 
Managed / 
Manager 
€46,564,302 €30,000,000 €106,359,229 €1,342,857 €666,666,667   223 
Industry Market 
/ Book 3.620 4.1067 1.303 2.277 5.2   223 
Book Value €7,172,996 €3,607,000 €11,360,543 €50,000 €108,000,000   223 
Early Stage 
Investee 0.677 1 0.469 0 1 151 223 
Entrepreneur 
Experience 
Rank 
6.381 6 1.675 1 10   223 
Transaction 
Characteristics               
Sum of Veto 
Rights 3.570 5 2.019 0 5   223 
Sum of Control 
Rights 4.511 5 2.541 0 9   223 
Common Equity 0.448 0 0.498 0 1 100 223 
Convertible 
Preferred Equity 0.323 0 0.469 0 1 72 223 
Debt and 
Common 0.193 0 0.395 0 1 43 223 
Debt 0.036 0 0.186 0 1 8 223 
Prior Round 0.112 0 0.216 0 1 25 223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Relationships between Preplanned Exits and Actual Exits 
This table presents the relationship between preplanned exits at the time of first investment (including 
investments for which there was no clearly defined exit strategy in terms of seeking an IPO or 
acquisition at the time of first investment), and the actual exit as at 2005. 
 Preplanned Exits 
 Preplaned IPO 
Preplanned 
Acquisition 
No Preplanned 
Exit at Time of 
First Investment 
Total 
Actual 
Exits 
IPO 6 1 25 32 
Acquisition 5 27 42 74 
Buyback 0 2 15 17 
Write-off 5 9 50 64 
No Exit 9 6 21 36 
Total 25 45 153 223 
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlation coefficients across each of the variables defined in Table 1 Panel A.  Correlations significant at the 5% level of significance are highlighted in underline font. 
  Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
  Transaction Characteristics                                        
(1) Sum of Veto Rights 1.00                                         
(2) Sum of Control Rights 0.54 1.00                                       
(3) Common Equity -0.27 -0.41 1.00                                     
(4) Convertible Preferred Equity 0.08 0.18 -0.62 1.00                                   
(5) Debt and Common 0.21 0.21 -0.44 -0.34 1.00                                 
(6) Debt 0.08 0.18 -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 1.00                               
(7) Prior Round -0.19 -0.16 0.05 0.06 -0.10 -0.07 1.00                             
  Preplanned Exit Strategy                                           
(8) Preplanned Acquisition 0.18 0.29 -0.18 0.11 0.04 0.14 -0.04 1.00                           
(9) Preplanned IPO -0.05 -0.11 0.17 -0.03 -0.17 0.01 0.10 -0.18 1.00                         
  Market Conditions and Institutional Variables                                           
(10) Log of Legality Index 0.21 0.26 -0.04 -0.21 0.27 0.07 -0.01 0.18 0.07 1.00                       
(11) Anti-Director Rights -0.28 -0.22 0.05 0.01 -0.13 0.12 -0.14 0.26 0.16 0.23 1.00                     
(12) Creditor Rights 0.41 0.11 0.04 -0.18 0.23 -0.12 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.28 -0.41 1.00                   
(13) Log of GNP Per Capita 0.09 0.10 0.13 -0.24 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.81 0.26 0.12 1.00                 
(14) German Legal Origin Dummy -0.02 -0.04 0.12 0.02 -0.23 0.12 -0.01 0.30 0.35 0.27 0.43 -0.22 0.42 1.00               
  Socialist Legal Origin Dummy -0.11 -0.10 -0.16 0.31 -0.14 -0.06 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.75 -0.21 -0.23 -0.86 -0.20 1.00             
(15) Scandinavian Legal Origin Dummy -0.12 0.03 0.00 0.11 -0.11 -0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.15 0.26 0.15 0.16 -0.16 -0.07 1.00           
(16) Investor and Investee Characteristics                                           
(17) Captive Fund 0.24 -0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.17 0.21 -0.05 0.10 0.13 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.07 0.09 -0.21 0.09 1.00         
(18) Log of Capital Managed / Manager 0.24 0.04 -0.11 -0.07 0.18 0.07 0.19 -0.04 -0.04 0.38 -0.24 0.36 0.49 -0.09 -0.46 0.03 0.17 1.00       
(19) Log of Industry Market / Book -0.13 -0.11 0.08 0.01 -0.17 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.11 -0.28 0.08 0.35 -0.06 -0.17 0.18 -0.04 1.00     
(20) Log of Book Value 0.01 -0.07 0.13 -0.14 0.16 -0.35 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.04 -0.19 0.24 0.06 -0.14 0.00 0.15 -0.24 0.11 -0.26 1.00   
(21) Early Stage Investee -0.20 -0.17 0.10 0.19 -0.42 0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.11 -0.25 -0.08 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.35 -0.18 0.47 -0.42 1.00 
(22) Entrepreneur Experience Rank -0.05 -0.13 0.30 -0.14 -0.18 -0.06 0.06 -0.11 0.17 -0.07 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.17 0.07 -0.14 -0.12 0.06 0.08 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics and Difference Tests  
This table presents different of proportions tests for the proportion of common equity and convertible preferred equity contracts used for preplanned IPO investments and preplanned acquisition exits., as well as 
a variety of specific veto and control rights.  This table further presents difference of means and medians tests for the number of veto and control rights (for the different rights enumerated in Table 1) for 
preplanned IPOs and preplanned acquisitions.  *, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Preplanned IPOs Preplanned Acquisitions Difference of 
Proportions 
Test 
Difference 
of Means 
Test 
Difference of 
Medians Test 
Number of 
Preplanned 
IPOs 
Proportion Mean Median 
Number of 
Preplanned 
Acquisitions 
Proportion Mean Median 
                        
Common Equity 25 0.68 --- --- 45 0.27 --- --- 3.36*** --- --- 
                        
Convertible Preferred Equity 25 0.28 --- --- 45 0.42 --- --- -1.18 --- --- 
                        
Number of Veto Rights 25 --- 3.28 5 45  4.29 5 --- -2.05** p <= 0.052*  
                        
Number of Control Rights 25 --- 3.92 4 45   6.24 6 --- -4.27*** p <= 0.001*** 
                        
First Refusal in Sale 25 0.68 --- --- 45 0.67 --- --- 0.11 --- --- 
                        
Co-Sale Rights 25 0.76 --- --- 45 0.89 --- --- -1.42 --- --- 
                        
Anti-Dilution Rights 25 0.36 --- --- 45 0.89 --- --- -4.63*** --- --- 
                        
Drag Along Rights 25 0.08 --- --- 45 0.36 --- --- -2.53** --- --- 
                        
Redemption Rights 25 0.24 --- --- 45 0.58 --- --- -2.74*** --- --- 
                        
Protection Rights Against New Issues 25 0.48 --- --- 45 0.82 --- --- -2.97*** --- --- 
            
Veto Asset Sales 25 0.68 --- --- 45 0.89 --- --- -2.15** --- --- 
                        
Veto Asset Purchases 25 0.68 --- --- 45 0.84 --- --- -1.61 --- --- 
                        
Veto Changes in Control 25 0.64 --- --- 45 0.84 --- --- -1.95* --- --- 
                        
Veto Issue Equity 25 0.68 --- --- 45 0.84 --- --- -1.61 --- --- 
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Table 6. Regression Analyses of Sum of Veto and Control Rights 
This table presents ordered logit estimates of the number of veto and control rights.  The variables are as defined in Table 1.  For conciseness, the standard logit coefficients are presented; marginal 
effects are discussed in the text of the paper (the marginal effects differ for each outcome 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.).  Models 4, 5, 9 and 10 use dummy variables for all years 1995 – 2001; a dummy variable 
for 2002 is excluded to avoid perfect collinearity.  Models 5 and 10 exclude late stage investments from the sample.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  LHS Variable = Sum of Veto Rights LHS Variable = Sum of Control Rights 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Constant -7.578*** -7.530* -10.018** -9.148* -12.600** -5.703*** -2.574 0.549 2.073 4.365 
Year of Investment Dummy Variables? No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Preplanned Exit Strategy                   
Preplanned Acquisition 0.522** 0.681*** 0.555** 0.689*** 0.974*** 0.662*** 0.877*** 0.884*** 1.083*** 1.282*** 
Preplanned IPO     -0.219 -0.208 -0.451     0.135 0.210 0.053 
Legal and Economic Environment                     
Log (Legality) 2.787***         2.265***         
Log (GNP Per Capita)   0.850** 1.147** 1.055* 1.294**   0.381 0.365 0.211 -0.098 
German Legal Origin   -0.393* -0.040 -0.074 0.246   -0.501*** -0.503** -0.566** -0.112 
Socialist Legal Origin   0.287 1.481** 1.556** 2.788***   -0.016 -0.146 -0.160 0.229 
Scandinavian Legal Origin   -0.989** -1.141** -1.252*** -0.622   -0.138 0.192 0.068 0.836* 
Investor and Investee Variables                     
Captive Investor     0.892*** 0.965*** 1.414***     -0.221 -0.219 -0.257 
Log (Capital Managed (‘000) / Manager)     0.128 0.148 0.156     -0.052 -0.033 0.037 
Log (Industry Market / Book)     -0.469* -0.464* -0.179     -0.056 -0.045 0.084 
Log (Book Value)     -0.129* -0.136* -0.152     -0.182*** -0.189*** -0.289*** 
Early Stage Investee     -0.857*** -0.830***       -0.328* -0.319  
Entrepreneur Experience     0.018 0.030 0.034     -0.088** -0.074* -0.022 
Ordered Logit Cut-Off Parameters                     
m1 0.077** 0.078** 0.092** 0.094** 0.108** 0.109** 0.106** 0.110** 0.115** 0.059 
m2 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.134** 0.351*** 0.343*** 0.353*** 0.369*** 0.277*** 
m3 0.312*** 0.315*** 0.359*** 0.366*** 0.433*** 0.611*** 0.602*** 0.616*** 0.640*** 0.579*** 
m4 0.674*** 0.675*** 0.760*** 0.777*** 0.935*** 0.923*** 0.913*** 0.931*** 0.969*** 0.871*** 
m5           1.347*** 1.330*** 1.356*** 1.410*** 1.459*** 
m6           1.819*** 1.800*** 1.852*** 1.919*** 2.199*** 
m7           2.405*** 2.391*** 2.488*** 2.572*** 2.552*** 
m8           3.036*** 3.028*** 3.155*** 3.256*** 3.015*** 
m9           3.749*** 3.744*** 3.901*** 4.012*** 3.877*** 
Model Diagnostics                     
Number of Observations 223 223 223 223 151 223 223 223 223 151 
LogLikelihood -258.887 -259.779 -240.659 -237.046 -167.852 -475.368 -476.820 -468.668 -461.635 -296.787 
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.045 0.116 0.129 0.163 0.032 0.029 0.046 0.060 0.084 
Chi-Squared Statistic 26.456*** 24.672*** 62.911*** 70.138*** 65.206*** 31.348*** 28.444*** 44.748*** 58.814*** 54.578*** 
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Table 7. Regression Analyses of Specific Veto and Control Rights 
This table presents binary logit estimates of specific veto and control rights.  The variables are as defined in Table 1.  The marginal effects are presented to explicitly highlight economic significance 
alongside statistical significance.  Dummy variables for 1999 and 2000 are used; dummy variables for other years are excluded to avoid perfect collinearity.  Various legal origin variables were excluded in 
Models 11 and 12 for reasons of collinearity.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 11: Replace CEO 
Model 12: 
First 
Refusal 
Model 13: 
Co-Sale 
Model 14: 
Anti-
Dilution 
Model 15: 
Drag 
Along 
Model 16: 
Redemption 
Model 17: 
Protection 
Rights 
Against 
New Issues 
Model 18: 
Veto Asset 
Sale 
Model 19: 
Veto Asset 
Purchases 
Model 20: 
Veto 
Change 
Control 
Model 21: 
Veto Issue 
Equity 
Constant -6.777*** -2.820 -4.068 -0.709 -1.028 -0.601 -2.403 0.426 0.633 0.741 -3.452** 
Year of Investment Dummy 
Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Preplanned Exit Strategy                      
Preplanned Acquisition 0.282** 0.199** 0.447*** 0.485*** 0.057* 0.139*** 0.262*** 0.226*** 0.203*** 0.148** 0.077 
Preplanned IPO -0.034 0.174 0.223 -0.015 -0.149** 0.015 -0.003 0.005 0.021 -0.064 -0.193 
Legal and Economic Environment                      
Log (GNP Per Capita) 0.682*** 0.234 0.541* 0.115 0.136 0.061 0.379* -0.007 -0.057 -0.154 0.335* 
German Legal Origin -0.123   -0.247 -0.113** 0.080 -0.068*** -0.306** 0.035 0.031 0.048 -0.132 
Socialist Legal Origin   0.402*** -0.949 -0.638 0.411 -0.355 0.291*** 0.171 0.147 0.122 0.196*** 
Scandinavian Legal Origin -0.163   0.701 -0.088 0.029 -0.001 -0.319* -0.444** -0.414** -0.209 -0.699*** 
Investor and Investee Variables                      
Captive Investor -0.106 0.005 0.269** -0.036 0.017 -0.005 0.086 0.191*** 0.181** 0.172** 0.405*** 
Log (Capital Managed (‘000) / 
Manager) 0.106** 0.025 0.812 -0.026 -0.003 0.002 -0.088** 0.034 0.049 0.133*** 0.013 
Log (Industry Market / Book) -0.182 0.051 -0.237 0.123* -0.0002 0.048* 0.096 -0.147 -0.178* -0.025 -0.037 
Log (Book Value) -0.062* -0.022 -0.177*** -0.007 -0.016 -0.002 -0.019 -0.033 -0.013 -0.042 0.023 
Early Stage Investee -0.323*** 0.210** -0.423*** -0.080 -0.152* -0.045* -0.172** -0.253*** -0.198*** -0.163** -0.147*** 
Entrepreneur Experience -0.029 0.031 0.446 -0.020 -0.053*** -0.006 -0.016 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.012 
Model Diagnostics                      
Number of Observations 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 
LogLikelihood -110.177 -139.401 -74.510 -115.044 -109.634 -120.720 -128.542 -108.042 -114.767 -106.224 -90.045 
Pseudo R2 0.267 0.090 0.443 0.247 0.103 0.180 0.106 0.186 0.153 0.169 0.284 
Chi-Squared Statistic 80.445*** 27.533*** 118.330*** 75.273*** 25.309** 52.972*** 30.356*** 49.423*** 41.368*** 43.177*** 71.260*** 
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Table 8. Regression Analyses of Security Design 
This table presents binary logit estimates of the use of common equity and convertible preferred equity.  The variables are as defined in Table 1.  The marginal effects are presented to explicitly 
highlight economic significance alongside statistical significance.  Models 25, 26, 30 and 31 use dummy variables for all years 1995 – 2001; a dummy variable for 2002 is excluded to avoid 
perfect collinearity.  Models 26 and 31 exclude late stage investments from the sample.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 LHS Variable = Common Equity LHS Variable = Convertible Preferred Equity 
 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 
Constant 0.111 4.406 -1.023 -0.259 5.221 2.757*** 1.069 2.650 0.833 1.322 
Year of Investment Dummy Variables? No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Preplanned Exit Strategy           
Preplanned Acquisition -0.226*** -0.315*** -0.328*** -0.336*** -0.353*** 0.188** 0.143* 0.184* 0.136** 0.301* 
Preplanned IPO   -0.036 -0.077 -0.087   0.098 0.113 0.220 
Legal and Economic Environment           
Log (Legality) -0.039     -0.989***     
Log (GNP Per Capita)  -0.438 0.043 -0.041 -0.437  -0.137 -0.314 -0.105 -0.256 
German Legal Origin  0.196* 0.152 0.176 0.104  0.118 0.140 0.050 0.002 
Socialist Legal Origin  -0.581*** -0.417*** -0.457*** -0.659***  0.467** 0.387 0.554* 0.692*** 
Scandinavian Legal Origin  -0.113 -0.166 -0.126 -0.343**  0.362** 0.495*** 0.348** 0.579*** 
Investor and Investee Variables           
Captive Investor   0.005 0.024 0.001   -0.067 -0.046 -0.152 
Log (Capital Managed (‘000) / Manager)   -0.123** -0.143*** -0.255***   .090** 0.056** 0.163** 
Log (Industry Market / Book)   0.040 0.031 -0.120   -0.113 -0.060 0.029 
Log (Book Value)   0.131*** 0.126*** 0.241***   -0.054 -0.025 -0.072 
Early Stage Investee   0.188* 0.223**    .185** 7.09E-02  
Entrepreneur Experience   0.092*** 0.099*** 0.051   -0.046** -0.029** -0.065** 
Model Diagnistics           
Number of Observations 223 223 223 223 151 223 223 223 223 151 
LogLikelihood -149.454 -142.179 -123.222 -118.015 -67.857 -133.011 -125.595 -116.109 -106.723 -69.982 
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.073 0.197 0.231 0.351 0.052 0.105 0.172 0.239 0.304 
Chi-Squared Statistic 7.858** 22.410*** 60.324*** 70.737*** 73.450*** 14.519*** 29.350*** 48.322*** 67.093*** 61.180*** 
 
